It having been so long since I posted, I thought that the day of
the Presidential Election results would be a good time, and provide a good
topic (in case I’m accused from the start of being confused, this was written
yesterday – the actual day of the results!). I don’t profess to know
more than you could have found out from the BBC, or any other half-decent news
organisation – but I do have the advantage of having followed things quite
closely here, which my readers may not have. If you have, then you may find this
account a little simplistic; I may even be accused of ignorance in some facts.
But please give me your indulgence: this is not a painstakingly researched,
intellectual account of events over the past couple of months, but simply the
perspective of a vague foreigner with less than perfect Arabic.
On
to the topic of today’s post:
the election. For a little background, it took place, as in the French system,
in two rounds, though here they have been divided by a month. Though by the
time you get this, you will probably have heard the final result, I am going to
go through events chronologically, as I experienced them, so allow yourselves
to imagine that we are in late May. There are quite a few candidates, but most
of them aren’t important and won’t get anywhere, and anyway, I don’t know their
names. These are the important ones:
Mohamed Mohamed Morsi (this is not a mistake – I refer you back
to an earlier post in which I explained the Egyptian
system of names), the Muslim Brotherhood candidate. He was the Brotherhood’s
second choice, the first having been banned, is not well-known outside of the
Presidential race, and is quite uncharismatic.
Abu el-Fotouh used to
be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but sat someway further towards the
political centre than the leadership, was rather vocal in his opposition, and
was finally expelled from the organisation when he announced he would run for
President as an independent (this was in defiance of a Brotherhood decision not
to field a candidate for the Presidency. Apparently, they changed their mind).
In contrast to Morsi, he is very charismatic, and had a large following among
the Islamist-ly inclined who weren’t affiliated to the Brotherhood. Curiously
(being a relatively liberal Islamist) he also had quite a following among the
Salafists, after their own candidate was also banned (more on that below). He
was considered to be one of two main ‘candidates of the revolution’ – those who
had been involved in the revolution itself, and were largely supported by the
revolutionaries.
Another
candidate in the relative centre-ground was Amro
Moussa, the former Foreign Minister and head of the Arab League - he lost
some support for being a former-Mubarakite (though I believe that he wasn’t too
popular with Mubarak by the end).
The
second ‘candidate of the revolution’ was Hamdeen
Sabahi a charismatic
Nasserite who is particularly popular among the youth (and bearing in mind
Egypt's demographics, 'the youth' is quite a lot of people). His policies
looked somewhat horrific for the economy – at their most basic, he wanted to legislate
for wages to rise and prices to fall, as well as nationalising various
industries and introducing new subsidies here and there (the subsidies are
already a problem: The Economist noted on 19 May that if Egypt were to abolish
its fuel subsidy, its 10% budget deficit would be wiped out – though I’m not
sure whether they included in their calculations what happens to the economy
when a large proportion of the population can no longer put petrol in their
tanks, or gas in their oven).
Finally,
among the main candidates, there is Ahmed
Shafiq, the ‘stability candidate’. He was Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, a
former Air Force general, and is thought (unsurprisingly) to be the favoured
candidate of Egypt’s ‘deep state’. He is particularly popular among Christians
(who persecuted by official Egypt already, fear Islamist power), the
upper-middle class (who did rather well out of the former regime), and many of
those who weren’t really bothered by the revolution in the first place, and
feel that things have just got worse since.
If
you’re wondering why I have gone into such detail on a raft of candidates most
of whom didn’t even make into the second round, it is in the hope of providing
some background to the tensions that followed for the second. As you probably
know, only Morsi and Shafiq made it into the second round, with about 47% of
the first round vote between them. Abu el-Fotouh and Moussa, who came fourth
and fifth respectively, were widely thought to have a very high chance of
making it through to the second round, but ultimately occupied too close a
position among the field of candidates, and split the moderate vote.
Sabahi
came third, but won Alex, and about 20% of the total vote. He was very quick to
claim foul play, and on the night of the first round result I stumbled into
three different protests by his supporters whilst walking around Alex. Other
candidates also cried foul, but unlike in the parliamentary elections (in which
I heard several first hand accounts of dodgy practices) there didn’t appear to
be a great deal of evidence, and the electoral commission dismissed the
complaints out of hand. (This is not to say that they were without basis, just
that I don’t know, and am sceptical. I probably would have ordered an
investigation, had I been the commission – not to do so looked suspicious in
itself.) There were two key disappointing outcomes to the first round. The
first was the protesting the result. I felt that, especially coming from those
who had launched the revolution in order to bring about democracy, to protest
the result of a democratic election (as opposed to the policies of a
democratically elected leader) because one doesn’t support the winners is
hypocritical. However, the second was the result, which left an unpleasant
choice for many people (particularly those who had risked their lives to bring
about the possibility of an election in the first place). On the one hand, a
vote for Morsi was a vote for the Muslim Brotherhood – he is very much a
creature of the organisation, and it is feasible that he wouldn’t ultimately be
taking some of the decisions supposedly taken by the President. On the other
hand, a vote for Shafiq would have been a vote for the old regime, for the
army, and specifically for a man with blood on his hands. If he had won (which
rather gives the game away that he didn’t), the army and the ‘deep state’ would
have viewed the revolution as a brief hiatus in their natural rule – and I
wouldn’t have been surprised for there not to have been a free election when the
next is due. Of course, the same may be true with Morsi in the Presidential
Palace – especially if the army decides that the Brotherhood is no threat to
its power.
Between
the second round and the result, another unpleasant twist in the drama
occurred. The voting took place over two days. At the end ofthe second day the
military announced that Parliament was to be dissolved (this was the result of
a case in the Supreme Court which challenged the results in a third of the
seats, because they were meant to be reserved for independents and were won by
party candidates – it was expected that there would be by-elections in those
seats, but the military appears to have taken the opportunity the judgement
provided), that the constitutional assembly was dissolved, that they were
assuming all legislative power, and the power to appoint a new constitutional
assembly. In essence, this was a coup (though against what, it’s hard to see –
they don’t appear to have done anything illegal, given the powers that they
assumed after the revolution), and severely circumscribes the power of the new
President. This in itself put people on edge; the tension was further
exacerbated by the election results (due last Thursday) being delayed.
Initially, it was announced that this was so that the Electoral Commission
could address irregularities; then the army said it was to prevent civil
unrest. The change of explanation prompted a gut feeling that the delay was in
order to rig the vote, and the protests (which were already quite large) grew.
I fear that this is essentially the end of the road for the revolution; though
with Morsi as President, there will be some remaining pressure on the military
to concede its powers back to the Parliament or the President – or to launch a
full-fat coup.
The
feeling in Cairo today was exceedingly tense. When I went out at ten this
morning, things were relatively normal, though the traffic was light. When I
returned to the centre of town at two, the traffic was exceedingly heavy, which
(though Cairo is usually quite congested) seemed abnormal. And then, by 3pm,
there were almost no cars on the street at all until the result was finally
announced (after an interminable speech by the monotonous head of the Electoral
Commission) when the streets exploded in relief and celebration. Morsi had won
by 13 million to 12 million. Those who aren’t celebrating remain indoors. They
include the staff of my hostel, who are miserable – but they would have been
miserable with either result, and possibly see this as marginally preferable to
the other outcome. Those I have spoken to either spoilt their ballot or did not
vote in the second round. The younger of my friends in Alex were also deeply
unhappy about the choice they were presented with. The older, by and large, voted
for Shafiq. Both groups will be disappointed and nervous following the result.
Update: 25 June
Things today are much more relaxed, and pretty much back to
normal. The prevailing sense seems to be relief. We shall see how long that
lasts…
